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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Section
78-2a-3(2)(h) of the Utah Code.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice
of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(a)

Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or
conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion
is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither
the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in
providing the relevant portions of the transcript. Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Rule 11(e)(2)
Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a
criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under
these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney
fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the
party or by the party's attorney. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33(a)
Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or
other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or
not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one
interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in
the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal,
motion, brief or other paper. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33(b)
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STATEMENT OF CASE, COURSE OF
PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION IN COURT

The Plaintiff, Mark Plaskon (hereafter "Plaskon"), filed this action on November 21,
1989 to recover damages he claimed to have sustained as a result of the Respondents' (hereafter
"Double D") alleged conversion of his personal property. In his Complaint, Plaskon alleged that
Double D wrongfully sold certain items of his property which had been stored in the Double D
Storage Garage, a self-storage facility owned by Double D. Plaskon claimed that Double D sold
his property without giving him proper notice and without following proper procedures. Double
D answered Plaskon's Complaint and raised the defense of "lack of standing to sue," among
others.
On October 4,1990, the matter was tried without a jury before the Honorable Douglas L.
Cornaby. After hearing the evidence presented by both parties, Judge Cornaby found that there
was no contract between the parties. As a result of finding a lack of privity of contract, Judge
Cornaby ruled that Plaskon did not have standing to sue Double D and dismissed Plaskon's
claims.
On or about November 20,1990, Plaskon filed a Notice of Appeal, complaining that the
Trial Court had ignored evidence which supported the existence of a contract between himself
and Double D. On November 22,1991, the Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court's ruling
and found that the lower court erred "in finding that no contract existed between Plaintiff and
Double D." Based on the Court's further finding that Double D's sale of Plaskon's property was
not conducted pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 38-3-1, et seq. (1988), the Court of
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Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded for a determination of the damages incurred by
Plaskon.
On February 17,1993, this matter came before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott for trial
on the issue of Plaskon's damages. After hearing the evidence, Judge Memmott granted Plaskon
judgment in the amount of $1,392.98, plus ten percent (10%) prejudgment interest from the date
of the sale of the decoys, June 10,1988, through March 4,1993. 1 However, the Court refused to
award any damages for Plaskon's alleged loss of business income.
On or about March 10,1994, Plaskon filed a Motion To Reconsider, wherein he asked the
Court to reconsider its refusal to award him loss of business income (See Addendum). In the
form of a signed Minute Entry, the Court denied Plaskon's Motion on September 12,1994 (See
Addendum). On that same date, the Court also signed a Judgment, Order and Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, prepared by Plaskon's attorney, which summarized Judge Memmott's
February 17,1993 ruling in the above matter (See Addendum).
Although Judge Memmott had signed a Minute Entry denying Plaskon's request for lost
business income, Plaskon submitted an Order Denying Motion to Reconsider to the Judge on
March 6,1995 (See Addendum). The Order was signed on that date.
On April 5,1995, Plaskon filed his Notice of Appeal (See Addendum).
On June 21,1995, Double D filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion for Summary Disposition, arguing that Plaskon's appeal was not filed in a timely matter

lr

The Court calculated Plaskon's damages based upon the amount for which he initially
purchased the decoys.
3

and that, accordingly, Plaskon's appeal should be dismissed and Double D awarded attorney fees
and court costs.
On October 2,1995, Chief Justice Michael D. Zimmerman deferred ruling on Double D's
Motion for Summary Disposition until further consideration.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Defendants (hereafter "Double D") are the owners of the Double D Storage

Garages (a self-storage facility), which are located in Bountiful, Utah. (Tr. at 67.)
2.

During the period from August 1,1986 through July 11,1987, Plaskon resided

with his girlfriend, Paulette McFarland, in Bountiful, Utah. (Tr. at 28, 32.)
3.

On July 11, 1987, Ms. McFarland contacted one of the Defendants, Carma

Jenkins, concerning the rental of storage space in the Double D storage facility. Ms. McFarland
indicated that she was having problems with her boyfriend, Mr. Plaskon, and wanted to move
him out of her home. She contacted Double D while Plaskon was out of town. (Tr. at 67-70.)
4.

Ms. McFarland agreed to rent space 108 in the storage facility and signed a rental

agreement. The rental agreement provided for rent of $40.00 per month and a $2.00 key deposit.
(Defendant's Ex. 1; Tr. at 33-35.)
5.

Ms. McFarland further indicated that she was only renting the facility for one

month and that Plaskon would need to make arrangements with Double D if he wanted to keep
his things stored for a longer period. In accordance with her statement, Ms. McFarland signed
another document bearing Mr. Plaskon's name which stated:
I, Mark J. Plaskon, agree to rent storage unit 108 for a period of one month for a
total amount of $40.00 plus $2.00 key deposit.
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The $2.00 key deposit will be returned upon receipt of key and notification that
tenant has vacated unit.
Ms. McFarland signed this document in Mr. Plaskon's name and later gave him a
copy. (Tr. at 33-35, 38, 67-70; Plaintiffs Ex. 2.)
6.

After Ms. McFarland had rented space 108, she proceeded to move several duck

decoys, which belonged to Plaskon, into the storage unit. (Tr. at 45, 47.)
7.

Mr. Plaskon's property stayed in the storage facility until August of 1988. Double

D testified that during this time, Mr. Plaskon did not contact them for any reason nor did he pay
any rent. During this same period of time, Double D attempted to locate Mr. Plaskon to
determine what he desired to do with his property. Double D was unsuccessful in its efforts.
(Tr. at 73-76, 86-87, 90, 93-94, 96.)
8-

In August of 1988, and after having failed to receive any rental payments or

direction from Mr. Plaskon as to what should be done with the property, Double D sold the duck
decoys contained in the storage facility. The decoys were sold for the amount of $575.00. The
rent owing at that time was approximately $610.00. (Tr. at 72-79, 96,104.)
9.

In November of 1988, Plaskon went to the storage facility and found that his

decoys were gone. He confronted Double D and was told that the decoys had been sold to cover
past due rent. This suit then followed. (Tr. at 93-94.)
10.

On February 17,1993, more than three years after Plaskon initiated this matter,

the Honorable Jon M. Memmott awarded Plaskon damages in the amount of $1,392.98, plus
10% prejudgement interest. (R. at 129.) However, the Court denied Plaskon any damages for his
alleged loss of business income. (R. at 141-143.)
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11.

On March 10,1994, more than one year after Judge Memmott's ruling, Plaskon's

attorney filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court's refusal to grant Plaskon damages for loss of
business income. (R. at 151.) The Court denied Plaskon's Motion on September 12,1994, in a
signed Minute Entry. (R. at 162). On the above date, the Court also signed a Judgment, Order
and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which summarized the Court's holdings regarding
Plaskon's damages. (R. at 153.)
12.

On April 5,1995, almost one year after Judge Memmott denied Plaskon's Motion

to Reconsider and signed the Order regarding Plaskon's damages, Plaskon filed an appeal from
the Trial Court to the Appellate Court. (R. at 165.)
13.

Double D has incurred attorney fees in defending this untimely appeal, which has

been brought in violation of Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaskon's appeal should be dismissed because it was not filed in a timely manner.
However, if Plaskon's appeal is not dismissed, the Trial Court's judgments should be affirmed
on appeal for the following reasons. First, Plaskon's arguments are not supported by the record,
inasmuch as he failed to request a trial transcript pursuant to Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Second, the Trial Court's award of damages to Plaskon, based upon the
decoys' value at the time they were initially purchased by Plaskon, was proper, in that the
Court's findings and conclusions are well supported by the record. Furthermore, Plaskon's
request for punitive damages is improper on appeal inasmuch as he failed to initially raise such
issue at trial. Third, the Trial Court properly denied Plaskon's request for compensatory
damages, in the form of lost business income, because Plaskon failed to establish his lost profits
6

with reasonable certainty. Finally, this Court should award Double D damages based upon the
frivolous nature of Plaskon's appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS PLASKON'S APPEAL AS UNTIMELY

Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that:
[I]n a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the Trial
Court to the Appellate Court, the Notice of Appeal required by Rule 3 shall be
filed with the clerk of the Trial Court within thirty (30) days after the date of entry
of the Judgment or Order appealed.
Although the Trial Court entered judgment in this matter on September 13,1994, Plaskon
failed to file this appeal until April 5,1995, in direct violation of Rule 4(a).
Plaskon argues that he had no obligation to file an appeal until thirty days following the
Trial Court's signing of an Order denying his Motion to Reconsider, despite the fact that the
Trial Court denied Plaskon's Motion in a signed Minute Entry on September 12,1994. Plaskon
reasons that the statute of limitations was tolled until the Court signed an Order formally
dismissing his Motion. Plaskon's argument is contrary to established Utah case law. In fact, the
Utah Supreme Court has held that "[a] signed minute entry may be a final order for purposes of
appeal... [if] 'the ruling specifies with certainty a final determination of the rights of the parties
and is susceptible of enforcement.'" Dove v. Cude. 710 P.2d 170,171 n. 1 (Utah 1985) (quoting
Cannon v. Keller. 692 P.2d 740, 740 n. 1 (Utah 1984)). See also McNair v. Havward. 666 P.2d
321, 328 n. 6 (Utah 1983).
The signed Minute Entry in this matter was a final order for purposes of appeal because it
specified with certainty that there was no good cause shown in Plaskon's Motion to Reconsider
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regarding the issue of lost profits. (R. At 162.) The Minute Entry was also susceptible of
enforcement because the parties were put on notice that the Court would not reconsider its failure
to award Plaskon compensatory damages for his alleged loss of business income. Accordingly,
Plaskon's appeal should have been filed on or before October 12,1994, within thirty days after
the Trial Court signed the Minute Entry.
Plaskon attempted to correct his failure to file a timely appeal by forwarding an Order to
Judge Jon M. Memmott, for the purpose of formally denying his Motion. (R. at 163.)
Significantly, Plaskon did not file this Order until March 6,1995, approximately six months after
the Judge signed the Minute Entry. Plaskon's filing of an Order with the Court at such a late
date was nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to circumvent the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. In fact, under Plaskon's rationale, he could have waited another two or three years to
file an Order with the Court and would have still preserved his ability to appeal the Court's
decision. This Court should not tolerate such circumvention of the legal process nor allow
Double D to be prejudiced by such an untimely appeal.
Even if this Court decides that the above Minute Entry was not a final order for purposes
of appeal, Plaskon was still obligated to file his appeal on or before October 13,1994. Utah case
law provides that when a Motion to Reconsider is filed prior to the entry of a final judgment or
order, the time for filing a Notice of Appeal is not extended because such a motion is "simply a
reargument" of the issues raised by the parties at trial. Ron Shepherd, Inc. v. Sheilds, 882 P.2d
650, 653-655 (Utah 1994). This is exactly what occurred in this case. Plaskon filed his Motion
to Reconsider before Judge Memmott signed his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment and Order. Because Plaskon asked the Court to reconsider its ruling regarding loss of
8

business income in his Motion to Reconsider and because Plaskon brought this Motion before
the Judge had entered its Findings and judgment on this case, Plaskon's Motion was nothing
more than a reiteration of the arguments he presented to the Court at trial. Accordingly, Plaskon
could only have properly appealed Judge Memmott's ruling within 30 days after the Trial Court
entered its Findings and judgment on September 13,1994.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO HEAR PLASKON'S APPEAL
BECAUSE HE FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS ARGUMENTS FOR
APPEAL

The Trial Court's findings should be presumed correct by this Court because Plaskon
failed to provide the Court with a trial transcript, pursuant to Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, and failed to provide support in the record for his arguments. Rule 11(e)(2)
provides:
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither
the Court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in
providing the relevant portions of the transcript.
Although Plaskon's Brief is replete with assertions that the Trial Court improperly weighed
"uncontroverted testimony" and rendered improper holdings, Plaskon never supported his
assertions with the record, as Rule 11(e)(2) mandates. Hence, although Plaskon purported to
marshall evidence in his Brief, Plaskon failed to disprove the Trial Court's findings because he
did not support his arguments with the record.
The Utah Court of Appeals has said the following regarding the appellant's obligation
under Rule 11(e)(2):
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'If the appellant intents to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.' In
essence, Rule 11 directs counsel to provide this court with all evidence relevant to
the issues raised on appeal. 'Where the record before us is incomplete, we are
unable to review the evidence as a whole and must therefore presume that the
verdict was supported by admissible and competent evidence.'
Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998,1002 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Smith v. Yuicich. 699 P.2d
763, 765 (Utah 1985)).
Inasmuch as Plaskon has failed to provide this Court with "an adequate record to preserve
[his] arguments for review," Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App.
1990), and has, consequently, failed to "marshall all the evidence" to support his arguments, Id,
his "claim[s] of error [are] 'merely . . . unsupported, unilateral allegation^]' which this Court
should refuse to resolve. Horton at 849 (quoting State v. Nine Thousand One Hundred NinetyNine Dollars. 791 P.2d 213, 217 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)).

III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES WAS PROPER

The general law regarding a Trial Court's award of damages is that "[i]f there is a
reasonably certain basis for it in the evidence, a Trial Court's award of damages will be affirmed
on appeal." Henderson v. For-Shor Co.. 757 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 1988). In the present
case, the Trial Court's award of damages to Plaskon, based upon the value of the decoys when
Plaskon purchased them, was proper and should be affirmed on appeal because the Court's
findings and conclusions regarding damages are well supported by the record. The Court did not
randomly award damages at its discretion, but carefully considered all of the evidence and
testimony brought before it in making its decision. In fact, after receiving all of the evidence on
this issue, the Court determined that it could value the decoys in one of four ways. (R. at 127.)
10

After considering each of these possible valuations and the testimony preferred on each, the
Court chose to value the decoys based upon the price they were initially purchased by the
Plaintiff. (R. at 127.) Hence, the Court's decision was deliberately made only after considering
all of the evidence before it and, accordingly, should be affirmed on appeal.
Plaskon also argues that the Trial Court erred by failing to award him punitive damages.
Because Plaskon has initially requested punitive damages on appeal, and not at trial, this Court
should not consider Plaskon's request. "Generally, a [party] who fails to bring an issue before
the trial court is barred from asserting it initially on appeal." State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920,
922 (Utah App. 1991). See also State v. Pugmire, 898 P.2d 271 (Utah App. 1995), State v.
Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913 (Utah App. 1992) and State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1993).
No exception should be made for Plaskon.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLASKON
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF ALLEGED FUTURE
BUSINESS INCOME

The Court's failure to award Plaskon damages for his alleged loss of business income was
proper and completely consonant with Utah case law. Contrary to Plaskon's interpretation of the
Court's holding in this regard, the Court based its decision on Plaskon's utter inability to give the
Court a consistent figure upon which to base Plaskon's loss of business income, not upon the
Court's finding, in Plaskon's words, that an award of future income was inappropriate because
Plaskon's hunting business was an "avocation" rather than a "vocation."
As the record illustrates, Plaskon failed to establish his lost profits with reasonable
certainty. In fact, the Court noted that based upon the inconsistent figures provided in Plaskon's
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testimony, tax return, affidavit, and interrogatories that "the Plaintiff really [didn't] have an
accurate record of what his income was and that it really [was] an estimate." (R. at 141.) The
Court continued, "I think that there's some question as to what the true level of income was for
1986." (R. 141.) Based upon Plaskon's inability to provide the Court with an accurate statement
of his income and his concomitant "lack of credibility," the Court could not have awarded
Plaskon lost business income because such decision would be in opposition to an established
body of Utah case law on this issue.
In Utah the general rule is that "[l]ost profits must be established with reasonable
certainty." Cook Associates. Inc. v. Warnick. 664 P.2d 1161,1165 (Utah 1983). However,
because there are "so many factors of uncertainty" in establishing lost profits, "ordinarily profits
to be realized in the future are too speculative to base an award of damages thereon." First Sec.
Bank of Utah, N.A. v. J.B.J. Feedyards. Inc.. 653 P.2d 591, 596 (Utah 1982) (citing Howard v.
Ostergaard. 515 P.2d 442, 445 (Utah 1973)). Based upon Plaskon's inconsistent testimony
regarding his business income during the 1986 hunting season, the Court could make no other
conclusion than that Plaskon's future profits were too speculative to be awarded.
Plaskon's argument that the Court denied him an award of future profits because his
hunting business was an "avocation" rather than a "vocation" is completely groundless. As the
record indicates, the Court did refer to the part-time nature of Plaskon's business. (R. at 142.)
However, in so doing the Court was not stating that future profits are only awarded when the
business is a full-time operation. Rather, the Court referred to Plaskon's hunting business as
more of a hobby than a profession. Plaskon's testimony demonstrated that his hunting business
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was anything but an operation which functioned on a steady basis from year to year. In this
regard the Court noted:
. . . [F]or a number of reasons, including obtaining a new position in a job, marital
problems, for a number of reasons the Plaintiff chose of his own accord not to
continue the business. He had the opportunity to, if he desired to. But in 1987-88
decided not to continue in the hunting or guide business. In 1988 again had the
opportunity, if he had wanted, to contact the people to continue the business, but
for reasons of his own choice, decided not to continue the business for the first
part of the 1988 season. Therefore, the Court finds that while this was maybe not
a vocation, it was more of an avocation of the Plaintiff, something that I think he
clearly enjoyed doing, that he had skill.
(R. at 142.)
The Court's statement that Plaskon did not produce a net positive income figure further
demonstrates that the Court relied on Utah case law in denying Plaskon lost business income, not
upon the avocation versus vocation distinction. (R. at 142.) The general rule in Utah is that "[a]
party is entitled to recover only lost net profits." Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773,
774 (Utah 1986). In the record, Plaskon only introduced evidence, although inaccurate and
inconsistent, of his gross income during the 1986 hunting season. However, Utah case law
requires parties seeking lost future income to introduce evidence of their business' net profits "by
computing the difference between the gross profits and the expenses that would be incurred in
acquiring such profits." Id at 774. Plaskon failed to do so. Accordingly, inasmuch as "proof of
lost gross profits does not afford courts a proper bases for a damage award, where there is no
evidentiary basis on which to calculate net profits with reasonable certainty," the Court had a
further basis upon which to properly deny Plaskon's request for net lost profits. Id
V.

THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD DOUBLE D DAMAGES FOR
DEFENDING PLASKON'S FRIVOLOUS AND UNTIMELY APPEAL

13

Pursuant to Rule 33(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party is entitled to
damages, in the form of single or double costs . . . and/or reasonable attorney fees, "if the court
determines that a[n] . . . appeal taken . . . is either frivolous or for delay. "A frivolous appeal is
one "that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith
argument to extend, modify, or reserve existing law," while an appeal taken for delay is one
which is "interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the
cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or
other paper." Utah Ct. App. R. 33(a).
Plaskon's appeal is frivolous because it is not "well grounded in fact or law," Backstrom
Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall. 751 P.2d 1157,1160 (Utah App. 1988), and was taken for delay
because it was "'taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing/" will result '"in [the] delayed
implementation of the judgment of the lower court/" has '"increased the costs of litigation/" and
has '"dissipatfed] . . . the time and resources of the . . . Court.'" Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365,
369 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting Auburn Harpswell Ass'n. v. Day, 438 A.2d 234, 239 (Me. 1981).
Plaskon's appeal was not only brought in an untimely manner, but it raises on appeal an issue
which Plaskon never introduced at trial, it purposefully misinterprets the Trial Court's holding
regarding lost business income by creating the "avocation" versus "vocation" distinction, it
ignores Utah case law regarding compensatory damages and the Trial Court's discretion in
awarding such damages, and its arguments are not supported in the record, as mandated in Rule
11(e)(2).
Based upon the above, Double D respectfully requests that this Court exercise its
equitable powers by awarding Double D the a

rney fees which it has incurred in defending
14

Plaskon's appeal. This appeal has done nothing to clarify the Trial Court's decision, but has
served only to increase litigation costs, further harass Double D, and prolong a matter where the
attorney fees involved far exceed the small amount of damages which have been awarded.
Although "sanction[s]" for bringing a frivolous appeal [are] applied only in egregious cases . . .
this is exactly the type of case where such sanctions are warranted. Maughan v. Maughan, 770
P.2d 156,162 (Utah App. 1989).
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court's Findings and Judgment were proper and consonant with Utah case law,
including its denial of Plaskon's request for compensatory damages based upon the decoys'
replacement value, punitive damages, and lost business income. Double D respectfully requests
that Plaskon's appeal be dismissed as untimely and that Double D be awarded the attorney fees
and court costs it has incurred in defending this frivolous appeal.
DATED and SIGNED this _H

day of February, 1996.

HANKS & ROOKER, P.C.

RORIHENDRIX
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARK PLASKON,

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

I1 I d J fit ! I I
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DARWIN HAYES,
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Defendant.
COMES NOW the Pla I ntiff above namedJP

by and through his

counsel, John T, Caj ne, and hereby moves the above enti tl ed Court
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che uncontradicted testimon 1 ui Brown that PI a i nti ff h. ; t< I a :t c »3 ] ing
business and one which ]..,.. r,,; had the decoys available, wou] < I have
resulted in additional income to him during the periods set forth
1

in the litigation.
Prior to appealing this matter Plaintiff desires the Court
revisit that issue to determine whether or not the Court wants to
amend its Judgment with respect to the issue of business income.
DATED this 10th day of March, 1994^

v-^-x

CAINE
JOfflJ
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Motion to Reconsider to counsel for the
Defendant, Jim Hanks, Attorney at Law, 376 East 400 South #300,
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March, 1994.
.Secretary
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STATE OF UTAH
MARK PLASKON,
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MINUTE ENTRY

v.
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DARWIN IIA'WiS,
Defendant.
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Case No. 890746591
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Kathy Potts, Clerk
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• c nun -.vill deny the Motion to Reconsider and has signed the Judgment
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STATE OF UTAH
MARK PLASKON,
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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vs.
DARWIN HAYES,

Civil No. 890,46591
Defendant.
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"That Court

having heard this hearing having in mind that decision and having
heard the claim for damages now makes the following Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds with respect to the claim for damages as to
the value of the decoys.
1.

That the Plaintiff did store the decoys at the

storage unit owned by the Defendant.
2.

That the Defendant selling the decoys did not comply

with the above referenced statute in notifying the Plaintiff or
bidding or in selling as a private sale.
3.

That the Court has received evidence of four (4)

different values:
a)

The first value, the 1993 retail value;

b)

The 1988 resale value;

c)

The value that Plaintiff paid for the decoys

initially; and
d) The amount paid for the decoys by James Oswald.
4.

In assessing

damages

the Court

finds that the

appropriate value to be assigned to the decoys is the amount
Plaintiff paid Flambo for the decoys which was $1,722.35 for all
but approximately 90 of the decoys.
5. Based upon interpellation and the type of decoys the
Court finds that the value of the decoys was as follows: $62.20
for two

(2) dozen super magnum mallards, $29.65

for a dozen

floater geese, $312 for four (4) dozen mighty magnum Canada goose
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s h e l l s , $156 for h o v e r i n g wi ndsocks a n d $56.10 f o r si imi magnum
d e c o y s issue Ml
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2.

That

Plaii rtiff

further
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That the D e f e n d a n t s
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testimony
• t e >. a b o v e

statements and it appears to the Court that the Plaintiff does not
have an accurate record of what his income was and that his
figures are an estimate.
5. The Court further finds that no matter which of the
amounts was

accurate, these

were

gross

income

figures and

Defendant had expenses based upon that income which impacted his
income.
6.

Concerning the Plaintifffs income for 1987 for a

number of reasons, including obtaining a new position in a job,
marital problems, the Plaintiff chose, on his own accord, not to
continue his business.
to.

He had the opportunity to if he desired

That in 1987-88 the Plaintiff decided not to continue in the

hunting or guide business; in 1988 again the Plaintiff had the
opportunity

if he wanted to contact people to continue the

business, but reasons of his own choice, decided not to continue
the business for the first part of the 1988 season.
7. That the Plaintiff had skill and enjoyed hunting and
taking others hunting, but this was never intended to be a full
time job and was more of a avocation rather than a vocation.
8.

Therefore, because of the above facts, the Court

does not any net positive income.
WHEREFORE, from the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, the
Court concludes as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the actual value of the decoys and other personal

property items stored was $2,338.30.
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That this value should be
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2. That further, based upon the foregoing Findings the court
awards no damages for 1 oss of income.
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The Court awards no attorney's fees to either party.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to
counsel for the Defendant, Jim Hanks, Attorney at Law, 376 East
400 South #300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid this
day of

, 1994.
PAM PONTIUS, Secretary
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JOHN T. CAINE #0536 of
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN
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Ogden, U t a h 84401
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having heard this hearing having in mind that decision and having
heard the claim for damages and heretofore made and entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes the following
Judgment and Order:
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.

That the actual value of the decoys and other personal

property items stored was $2,338.30.

That this value should be

reduced by forty percent (40%) on the basis that they were damaged
due to the responsibility and actions of the Plaintiff in the case
and an additional offset of $10 which is the net difference in the
rent due, thus awarding Judgment from Plaintiff against the
Defendant in the sum of $1,392.98 plus prejudgment ten percent
(10%) interest from the date of the sale, June 10, 1988 through
March 4, 1993.

Post-judgment interest will then be awarded from

the date of the signing of this Order.
2. That further, based upon the foregoing Findings the Court
awards no damages for loss of income.
3.

The Court awards no attorney's fees to either party.

DATED this

\&& day of Aug&st', 1994.
JON MEMMOTT
District Court Judge
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STATE OF UTAH

MARK PLASKON,
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Plaintiff will submit the above and foregoing Order to the
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